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This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness and feasibility of two FDI policies, fiscal
incentives and deregulation, aimed at improving the attractiveness of a country in the short run. Using
disaggregated data on sales by US MNEs’ foreign affiliates in 43 developed and developing countries
over the 1982-1994 period, results show that the provision of fiscal incentives or the deregulation
of the labour market would exert a positive impact on total FDI. Given the drawbacks frequently
associated with the use of incentive packages, economy-wide policies which ease firing procedures
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1 Introduction
Most countries in the world welcome and compete for foreign direct investment (FDI) as foreign firms
are believed to foster the growth of their host countries. Recent literature (Globerman and Shapiro,
2002; Daude and Stein, 2007) emphasises that countries wishing to attract significantly more FDI need
to improve their governance. The aggregate indicators used in these studies provide a clear but not very
informative message for the policymarkers desiring to implement specific policies in order to rapidly
improve the attractiveness of their countries. The more detailed analysis of Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007)
pinpoints that in addition to the rule of law and control of corruption, product and labour markets reg-
ulations are important determinants of FDI. Whereas broad changes in the former are likely to occur
mainly in the long run, the “malleability” (Kucera, 2002) of the latter provides a government, potentially
motivated by short-term political considerations, with some policy options to complement or replace the
FDI incentives package traditionally used to lure FDI.
This paper investigates and compares the effectiveness and feasibility of these two FDI policies, fiscal
incentives and deregulation, using disaggregated data on sales by foreign affiliates of US multinational
enterprises (MNEs) in 43 developed and developing countries over the 1982-1994 period. Four signif-
icant contributions to the literature are made. First, the country sample and variables used provide a
comprehensive picture of the role of unit labour costs, taxation and regulations in simultaneously attract-
ing FDI. Second, the knowledge of sales destination allows the isolation of horizontal (HFDI), vertical
(VFDI) and export-platform (EPFDI) FDI. Their distinction is essential to avoid any aggregation bias and
to expose the different composition and volume effects of each FDI policy. Third, an innovative panel
data estimator is employed. The “fixed effects vector decomposition” (FEVD) estimator possesses the
unbiasedness and consistency properties of an usual fixed effects estimator but authorises the estimation
of the effects of time-invariant variables. Thanks to its application, various omitted variable biases which
have affected previous research and generated in some cases puzzling results can be uncovered. Finally,
in line with recent theoretical models of FDI, the influence of third country effects and spatial interde-
pendence on the location of FDI is investigated. A potential limitation of our empirical approach is our
reliance on the regulatory quality Doing Business indicators created by the World Bank (2004). Their
values are only available from 2003 whereas the rest of our data cover the 1982-1994 period. Hence,
2
we make the debatable assumption, which we motivate in section 3.a.ii, that regulatory quality has been
fairly stable in the two preceding decades.
Results show that the provision of fiscal incentives or the deregulation of the labour market would
exert a positive impact on total FDI. Given the drawbacks frequently associated with the use of incentive
packages, economy-wide policies aimed at easing firing procedures and reducing severance payments
would certainly be the best policy option. Their implementation would have large volume effects and
potentially positive compositional effects. The effect of easing the entry of new firms is more ambiguous
as results hint that their hindrance of competition generates economic rents which attract HFDI. This
suggests that reducing barriers to entry would have a direct negative effect on total FDI. However, this
negative effect is likely to be eventually dominated by the positive effects of the increase in market
size and labour market flexibility generated by product market deregulation. Finally, environmental
policies is an area in which countries can afford to regulate more as even FDI seeking to minimise
costs are indifferent to the stringency of environmental regulations. More generally, findings of this
paper underline the importance of disaggregating FDI by motive and of controlling for external market
potential and unobserved time-invariant factors. Failing to do so generates both aggregation and omitted
variable biases and results in the ignorance of important spatial effects which are found to affect the
location of VFDI and EPFDI.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 provides a selective literature review.
Section 3 describes the empirical model and estimation technique employed. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 quantifies the impacts of incentives and deregulation on FDI and discusses
the effectiveness and feasibility of these policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Foreign Direct Investment and Malleable Attractiveness Policies
There are three broad motives for FDI. In the horizontal view (Markusen, 1984), MNEs arise between
countries similar in factor costs and in market size when exporting is costly and firm-level economies of
scale are important relative to plant-level economies of scale. FDI is horizontal because MNEs replicate
the same production activities in different locations in order to gain an advantage in supplying the local
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market. In the vertical view (Helpman, 1984), FDI occurs between dissimilar countries to take advantage
of factor-price differences when trade costs are low. Production is exported back to the home country.
FDI is vertical because each production stage is located in the country with the highest comparative
advantage. Finally, export-platform FDI (Yeaple, 2003; Baltagi et al., 2007; Ekholm et al., 2007) share
characteristics with both horizontal and vertical FDI as production takes place in a low-cost country and
is exported to proximate large third markets.
These different FDI motives imply that the sensitivity of FDI to host country determinants will vary
according to the destination of production, although the three FDI types will often share common deter-
minants. Only the data collected by the US Bureau of Analysis on the operations of US MNEs allow
investigation of this issue, by providing information on the orientation of US foreign affiliate sales. Table
1 presents a selective literature review of the papers that have used these data to discriminate between
the three FDI types. Empirical findings are usually in line with theoretical predictions, with sign and
importance of each determinant depending on the nature of the observed FDI. However, these papers, by
focusing on the structural determinants of FDI location -market size, trade costs and factor endowments,
have frequently ignored the factors that host countries can manipulate in the short run, such as labour
costs, corporate taxation or regulations.
As can be seen in Table 1, wages have been hardly tested but the few studies which include them
confirm their negative impact on FDI, whichever the type. It is nevertheless fairly common to find in the
broad FDI literature an insignificant or even positive effect of wages on FDI (see for instance Wheeler
and Mody (1992), Wei (2000a) or Head and Mayer (2004)). These studies, with others finding a positive
impact of skill abundance on FDI, may be interpreted not as rejecting the relevance of labour costs in
FDI decision but as indirectly highlighting the crucial link between labour productivity, highly correlated
with wages, and production costs. This ambiguity emphasises the need to use productivity-adjusted
wages, i.e. unit labour costs. Regarding taxes, their empirical impact has become much more clear-cut
in recent years. Table 1 reports that they tend to exert a statistically significant and negative impact on
foreign sales of USMNEs, an unambiguous effect supported by the meta-analysis of Mooij and Ederveen
(2003). Harding and Smarzynska Javorcik (2007) directly test the impact of tax incentives and find that
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the presence of tax holidays quintuples aggregate FDI in developing countries granting them.1 This has
led a number of studies (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2005; Aze´mar and Delios, 2008) to stress the ability of
low taxes to compensate for weak fundamentals, in line with Tiebout (1956)’s trade-off between public
inputs and taxes. Although less considered by the literature, the same reasoning obviously holds for
policies aiming at lowering labour costs (Davies, 2005), e.g. labour subsidies (lower labour taxes) or free
job training.
In very recent times, a growing number of papers have shifted their attention away from fiscal and
financial incentives to point out that looser labour market regulations, usually in the form of lower re-
dundancy payments, can foster FDI when there is uncertainty about future market conditions. Haaland
et al. (2003) theoretically demonstrate the trade-off between upfront investment subsidy (entry costs) and
labour market flexibility (exit costs). Haaland and Wooton (2007) refine this argument by taking into
account endogenous wages determined through national bargaining and the risk level faced by MNEs.
It is worthwhile to note that a reduction of entry costs, through the provision of an investment subsidy,
exerts a smaller impact on FDI than a reduction of redundancy payments as the former only increases the
likelihood of FDI but not the size of any FDI that occurs whereas the latter positively influences both.
The option approach to investment (see Dixit and Pyndick (1994)) provides relatively similar intuitions.
Dixit (1989), and more recently Yu et al. (2007), show that investment is less likely to be made the higher
the sunk costs, the higher the operating costs and the higher the exit costs. Taking as a starting point
this theoretical framework, Go¨rg (2005) empirically shows that US outward manufacturing FDI stocks
in 33 mostly developed countries are lower in countries with high labour market regulations. Be´nassy-
Que´re´ et al. (2007), using the OECD bilateral FDI database, reach the same conclusions. In these two
studies, the included labour market variable captures the rigidity of both hiring and firing practices, mak-
ing impossible to know whether entry or exit costs have been in fine tested. Smarzynska Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2005) specifically test the impact of the strength of employment protection legislation and
find, for a specific sample of 19 Western and Eastern European countries, that firing costs and regulations
1The impact is based on the estimated coefficient (1.431) and standard errors (0.594) reported in the second column of Table
23, p.47. Following Kennedy (1981), the percentage impact is 100exp(1:431+(0:5942=2) 1 ' 400%. As the authors point
out, this large effect may in fact represent the cumulative impact of tax holidays and the presence of an investment promotion
agency on FDI. Their results thus suggest that investment promotion activities (national image building, investment generation,
investor servicing and policy advocacy) may be an additional short-run strategy for attracting FDI. We thank the referee for
drawing our attention to this study.
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affect the location and volume of FDI from other European countries. However, part of this negative ef-
fect may capture the impact of the untested difficulty of hiring. Concerning entry costs, there is little
empirical work on their direct influence on FDI, at the exception of Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) who
show that ease of market entry for new firms is associated with greater FDI. Since this study includes
labour regulations, entry costs or other institutional characteristics separately and instrument them with
the same exogenous variables, the coefficients of each of these institutional variables may only reflect
the influence of a common institutional factor and not a truly independent effect. Overall, there is some
limited empirical support for a positive influence of labour and product markets deregulation on FDI.
Finally, a few studies have investigated whether foreign investors, especially in pollution-intensive in-
dustries, try to minimise production costs by investing in countries with weak environmental regulations
and therefore low environmental compliance costs (Wheeler, 2001). Xing and Kolstad (2002) find some
fragile evidence that US pollution-intensive industries tend to invest more in countries with high sulphur
dioxide emissions, their proxy of environmental regulations, in a sample of 22 mostly developed coun-
tries. On the other hand, Javorcik Smarzynska and Shang-Jin (2005), using a sample of 25 economies in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, reject the hypothesis that US pollution-intensive industries
invest more in countries with low environmental standards than other industries but find in a minority
of cases that the volume of US FDI is higher ceteris paribus in those countries. Overall, the “pollution
haven” hypothesis has little empirical support but cannot be entirely dismissed.
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This short literature review identifies three areas in which contributions to the literature on FDI can
be made. First, the usual set of determinants, mainly related to domestic market access, needs to be
expanded in order to provide more evidence on the role of unit labour costs, taxation and regulations
in attracting FDI. From a host country perspective, investigation of the impact of cost and regulatory
factors are particularly important as they are those which can be relatively quickly altered by appropri-
ate government policies. Second, there is a need for using panel data and more representative country
samples. Cross-sectional studies comprise the bulk of research on determinants of total and decomposed
US foreign sales. The possibility of an omitted variable bias raises some doubt about their results. On
the other hand, panel data, more frequently used in studies investigating the determinants of financial
FDI flows/stocks, allows the introduction of individual effects which can at least capture the influence
of unobserved time-constant factors. In addition, many conclusions on important issues, such as the
importance of labour costs, labour market flexibility or weak environmental standards have been mainly
derived from works focusing on FDI in Western and Eastern European countries. It is unclear whether
they still hold for a more representative sample including developed and developing countries. Third,
the heterogenous nature of FDI implies that the impact of usual determinants government policies will
vary according to FDI motives. Using total FDI, as done in most studies, creates an aggregation bias and
without distinguishing between FDI motives, it cannot be shown the different composition and volume
effects of alternative policies on total FDI received by a given country. The composition effect may be
important if some FDI types are believed to be more beneficial to the local economy than others. With
a familiar log-log specification, the volume effect crucially depends on the currently predominant FDI
type in the host country. The rest of the paper is devoted to addressing these three issues.
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3 Empirical Model and Data Description
The following ‘gravity’ model2 will be estimated:
Ln(Sales)ti = 1Ln(Unit labour costs)
t 1
i + 2Ln(Tax rate)
t
i + 3Ln(Diff. starting a business)i +
4Ln(Diff. hiring)i + 5Ln(Diff. firing)i + 6Ln(Envt. regulation stringency)
t 1
i +
7Ln(GDP)t 1i + 8Ln(External market potential)
t 1
i + 9Ln(Population)
t 1
i +
10Ln(Country risk)t 1i + 11Ln(Trade openness)
t 1
i + 12Ln(Distance)i +
13English dummyi + T
t + ti
where ti = Ci+ 
t
i , with time-invariant country-specific effects Ci and idiosyncratic shocks 
t
i . The
production of MNEs in a given country can be sold on the local market, exported to the United States or
exported to other foreign countries. Surveys of US direct investment abroad carried by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) allow the investigation of these three motives by providing a decomposition
of the total sales of majority-owned foreign affiliates of US MNEs into these three destinations.3 As
customary in the literature, data of the 1982, 1989 and 1994 benchmark surveys are used since data
in non-benchmark survey years are usually estimated for small affiliates, which may be particularly
numerous in developing countries. Nominal values are converted into millions of real 1996 US dollars
using the US chain-type price index for gross domestic investment as reported in the Economic Report
of the President.4
Table 2 shows that, on average, local sales account for slightly more than two-thirds of total af-
filiate sales in developed and developing countries alike. However, at the country level, the pattern is
less obvious since in some locations, such as Ireland or Singapore, affiliates export most of their goods
and services to other markets. These large variations in FDI motives across countries suggest that the
2As noted by Blonigen et al. (2007) “the gravity model is arguably the most widely used empirical specification for FDI”
(p. 1309). Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and Head and Ries (2008) have recently provided theoretical rationales for estimating
FDI gravity equations.
3http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/di1usdop.htm Sales are a good proxy of the productive activities of US foreign
affiliates as long as most of the goods and services are not imported by affiliates for resale without further manufacture. That
seems to be the case, since in 1994 these imports represented on average only 4 per cent of the value of total sales.
4Deflator data are provided by Bruce Blonigen on his website http://www.uoregon.edu/˜bruceb/workpap.
html
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Table 2: Foreign sales of US MNE, by motivation
Share of
Country Total Sales Local sales Sales to Sales to other
USA foreign countries
Argentina 7,400 81 3 16
Australia 39,429 86 3 11
Austria 6,857 76 4 20
Belgium 32,587 44 4 53
Brazil 32,661 89 5 6
Canada 171,068 73 24 3
Chile 2,899 78 7 17
China 1,769 86 4 10
Colombia 5,360 88 5 7
Denmark 5,370 76 4 21
Ecuador 798 58 28 7
Finland 2,688 93 2 8
France 75,512 73 3 24
Germany 119,493 70 2 28
Greece 2,676 91 1 8
Guatemala 792 81 5 12
Honduras 1,160 77 11 14
Hongkong 18,936 47 20 33
India 696 94 2 5
Indonesia 10,015 42 21 37
Ireland 12,421 34 6 61
Israel 1,403 67 16 17
Italy 44,245 82 3 15
Jamaica 1,202 52 27 20
Japan 64,251 89 4 7
Korea 2,999 71 23 6
Malaysia 7,586 54 23 23
Mexico 23,721 75 21 4
New Zealand 3,582 94 2 5
Nigeria 3,659 28 64 6
Norway 8,823 53 9 31
Panama 2,499 41 14 44
Peru 1,688 62 14 6
Philippines 4,246 78 11 14
Portugal 3,706 81 1 18
Singapore 26,896 27 26 47
South Africa 5,329 92 0 8
Spain 22,525 75 2 23
Sweden 8,763 81 1 16
Thailand 6,246 75 9 17
Turkey 2,079 94 2 5
United kingdom 174,026 71 6 23
Venezuela 5,703 96 2 2
Developed countries 40,250 71% 7% 22%
Developing countries 5,932 72% 14% 13%
Notes: Average values of the benchmark survey years 1982, 1989 and 1994. Data come from the US BEA.
10
sensitivity of affiliate sales to host country characteristics varies according to their destination market.
a Government Policies
i Cost variables
Two major determinants of the profitability of FDI are labour costs and taxation.
Low wage locations are attractive as long as low labour compensation does not reflect low labour
productivity. Hence, an appropriate measure of labour costs is unit labour costs, i.e. the cost of labour
per unit of output. Since health and education enhance a worker’s productivity, this measure implicitly
controls for the level of human capital in the workforce. For data availability reasons, unit labour costs
correspond to those prevailing in the manufacturing sector. They are calculated by dividing average
wage per worker, including supplements, by value added per worker. Data come from UNIDO (1997)
and are available for the years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. Missing values have been filled through linear
interpolation.
Statutory tax rates may give a poor picture of the effective fiscal burden faced by MNE as they are
often eligible to a number of fiscal incentives. Hence the average tax rates paid by US MNEs are used.
They have been calculated by Grubert and Mutti (2000), on the basis of tax returns of more than 500
large US manufacturing MNE. Data have been kindly provided by the authors and are available for even
years between 1980 and 1996. Following Altshuler et al. (1998) and Mutti and Grubert (2004), in order
to reduce measurement error, average tax rates effectively paid correspond to the average of the current
year value and the values of the previous two even years.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on unit labour costs and average tax rates across countries. Devel-
oping countries offer, on average, cost saving opportunities as labour is much cheaper than in developed
countries. Average corporate taxes tend also to be lower but the difference is less pronounced, suggesting
that both country groups are involved in an international tax competition. Indeed, a comparison between
11
Table 3: Labour costs and corporate taxes
Country Unit labour Average Statutory top
costs tax rates (%) marginal tax rate (%)
Argentina 0.24 14 32
Australia 0.43 36 39
Austria 0.65 34 40
Belgium 0.45 31 43
Brazil 0.23 26 30
Canada 0.45 35 41
Chile 0.17 22 39
China 0.16 7 42
Colombia 0.18 31 33
Denmark 0.62 33 41
Ecuador 0.30 19 22
Finland 0.53 34 34
France 0.65 37 41
Germany 0.50 40 52
Greece 0.49 31 41
Guatemala 0.21 27 36
Honduras 0.43 40 38
Hongkong 0.57 13 17
India 0.46 46 50
Indonesia 0.16 33 38
Ireland 0.33 4 44
Israel 0.73 16 38
Italy 0.70 34 32
Jamaica 0.43 32 37
Japan 0.35 51 40
Korea 0.28 33 31
Malaysia 0.29 14 36
Mexico 0.21 34 38
New Zealand 0.65 34 35
Nigeria 0.19 30 40
Norway 0.71 31 28
Panama 0.36 11 45
Peru 0.17 38 40
Philippines 0.24 34 35
Portugal 0.62 28 38
Singapore 0.32 9 33
South Africa 0.50 38 43
Spain 0.54 25 34
Sweden 0.39 41 40
Thailand 0.33 28 30
Turkey 0.31 44 36
United Kingdom 0.49 27 40
Venezuela 0.23 27 43
Developed countries 0.53 30% 37%
Developing countries 0.28 28% 37%
Notes: Values are averaged over the 1982-1994 period. Data come from UNIDO (1997)
and Grubert and Mutti (2000).
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the average tax rates paid by US MNEs and the statutory top marginal tax rate5 clearly shows, despite the
discrepancies in tax measures, that most developed and developing countries offer US foreign investors
preferential tax treatment.
ii Regulation variables
Regulations can affect the volume of FDI received by a country by increasing entry costs, operational
costs and exit costs. Until recently, no measures of the regulatory environment were available for a large
number of countries. However, since 2004, the World Bank has addressed this gap by constructing
objective indicators of regulatory quality (see World Bank (2004)). For the purpose of this paper, three
variables have been selected, which broadly capture entry and exit regulatory costs:
1. the cost of starting a business: expressed as a percentage of income per capita, it corresponds to
the cost of fulfilling all procedures officially required for an entrepreneur to start a new business.
2. the difficulty of hiring workers: it covers the availability of part-time and fixed-term contracts,
which may provide a firm with more flexibility and lower costs than full time indefinite contracts.
The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulations.
3. the difficulty of firing: it encompasses grounds for dismissal, firing procedures, notice periods,
and severance payments. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid
regulations.
Data can be found on the World Bank Doing Business website.6 The Doing Business indicators have
been preferred to subjective measures of regulatory quality, such as those based on perception surveys
of enterprise managers, as it is not clear whether the latter convey meaningful information, especially
in the context of cross-country comparisons (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; World Bank, 2004).7
Furthermore, the World Bank regulation variables allow to distinguish the effects of the difficulty of
firing from those of the difficulty of hiring on FDI. Unfortunately, data are only available for the years
5Data have been retrieved from the World Tax Database http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/
introduction.htm
6http://www.doingbusiness.org/
7For instance, there is quasi no correlation between the observed starting costs and labour market rigidities and the answers
to the corresponding survey questions in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, as reported
in Gwartney and Lawson (2005).
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2003 and beyond. It is therefore postulated that regulations have been relatively stable in the last two
decades. Two pieces of evidence hint at the plausibility of this assumption. First, the World Bank
(2005) Doing Business report argues that reforms in developing countries have been very rare, even
though their regulations were developed decades or even a century ago. Second, the extremely high
correlation between the 1985 and 2003 values of the OECD’s overall summary indicator of the strictness
of employment protection legislation8 (r ' 0:92) suggests that regulations, at least in the labour market,
have not much changed in developed countries either. Values of the regulatory quality indicators for 2003
have been used.
Firms may also have to comply with regulations which increase their operational costs. For example,
stringent environmental regulations imply high pollution abatement costs. No measure of environmental
regulations is readily available. Following Damania et al. (2003) and Cole et al. (2006), it is assumed
that the stringency of environmental regulations is correlated with the grams of lead content per litre of
gasoline. As argued by the latter study, lead content in gasoline is mostly determined by policy decisions
and the high toxicity of lead emissions can make the reduction of this local air pollutant an early priority
during a country’s development. Yearly data on average maximum lead content in gasoline come from
Grether and Mathys (2002).
Values of the various measures of government regulations are provided in Table 4. On average,
developing countries tend to regulate business more than developed countries, with the exception of
environmental regulations. Entry costs are particularly higher in developing countries whereas the gap is
much narrower concerning exit costs, i.e. the difficulty of firing workers. These observations are in line
with Djankov et al. (2002) and Botero et al. (2004), who find that richer countries tend to regulate less
entry but do not offer more flexible labour laws than poorer countries. Finally, the large difference in lead
content per litre of gasoline suggests that the protection of the environment is a normal good (Torgler and
Garcia-Valinas, 2007).
8Data can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/5/39069225.xls
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Table 4: Regulation variables
Cost of Difficulty of Difficulty of Lead content
Country starting a business hiring firing per litre
(% of GDPPC) (0-100) (0-100) of gasoline
Argentina 12 44 20 0.39
Australia 2 0 10 0.52
Austria 6 0 40 0.08
Belgium 11 11 10 0.20
Brazil 13 67 0 0.19
Canada 1 11 0 0.18
Chile 12 33 20 0.63
China 18 11 40 0.14
Colombia 29 22 20 0.41
Denmark 0 0 10 0.08
Ecuador 52 44 50 0.78
Finland 1 33 40 0.13
France 1 67 40 0.24
Germany 6 33 40 0.08
Greece 37 44 40 0.24
Guatemala 66 44 0 0.43
Honduras 77 89 0 0.84
Hongkong 2 0 0 0.15
India 53 33 70 0.55
Indonesia 137 72 60 0.64
Ireland 10 11 20 0.21
Israel 6 11 0 0.22
Italy 17 33 40 0.26
Jamaica 16 11 0 0.74
Japan 11 0 30 0.00
Korea 18 11 40 0.17
Malaysia 26 0 30 0.35
Mexico 18 33 70 0.22
New Zealand 0 11 10 0.49
Nigeria 90 22 20 0.66
Norway 4 44 40 0.09
Panama 26 78 70 0.64
Peru 39 44 60 0.69
Philippines 25 56 30 0.65
Portugal 12 50 50 0.29
Singapore 1 0 0 0.20
South Africa 9 56 30 0.50
Spain 17 78 30 0.36
Sweden 1 17 40 0.08
Thailand 7 33 0 0.29
Turkey 37 44 30 0.44
United Kingdom 1 11 10 0.20
Venezuela 44 78 100 0.69
Developed countries 7 22 24 0.21
Developing countries 37 42 35 0.50
Notes: For the first columns, 2003 values are given. For the last column, values are averaged over the 1982-1994 period.
Data come from World Bank (2004) and Grether and Mathys (2002).
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b Control Variables
Besides the difficulties and costs of doing business, other country characteristics are controlled for:
domestic market size, external market potential, population, country risk, trade openness, bilateral dis-
tance and common language. Domestic market size, corresponding to GDP in millions of 2000 constant
PPP US$, reflects the potential domestic demand for the goods and services produced by US MNEs.
On the other hand, external market potential, a “third country effect”, captures the potential demand for
the goods and services produced by US MNEs in neighbouring countries. Following Harris (1954) and
Blonigen et al. (2007), it is calculated as the sum of the GDPs of all other countries weighted by their
distance to a given country:
P
i6=j
GDP tj
Distij
. Population size controls for the effect of host country wealth
on FDI since for a given GDP, a higher population decreases GDP per capita. GDP and population data
come fromHeston et al. (2006) and bilateral distances have been calculated byMayer and Zignago (2006)
based on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries.9 The measure of country
risk comes from Institutional Investor. Institutional Investor credit ratings are based on a survey of senior
economists and sovereign-risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and securities
firms, who are asked to rate each country on a scale from 0 to 100 (where 100 represents maximum
creditworthiness). These ratings are averaged, with higher weights given to firms with greater worldwide
exposure and more sophisticated country analysis systems. Rankings of critical factors by participants
show that their ratings are based on the usual determinants of country risk, i.e. political risk (rule of
law, corruption, transparency, political stability, regulatory regime, internal and external conflicts, rela-
tionship with multilaterals) financial risk (foreign exchange reserves, debt-service ratio, absolute level
of debt, export growth and diversity) and economic risk (GDP growth, budget balance, current account
balance, banking and financial stability). Furthermore, Butler and Fauver (2006) demonstrate that good
public governance, as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2004)’s indicators, exerts a much stronger influence
on the credit rating of a country than economic and financial factors. Data come from the World Bank
database on FDI.10 Based on Wei (2000b)’s methodology, a trade openness indicator is constructed. It
is the residual of the log-log regression of the standard trade openness ratio (X+MGDP ) on a time trend and
structural determinants of a country’s natural openness: population, landlockedness and remoteness from
9http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm
10http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/data.html
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world markets.11 Once these factors have been taken into account, it is assumed that any deviation from
predicted values is the consequence of trade policies, which influence the degree of artificial openness.
The indicator ranges between 1 and 10 (worst to best), according to the distribution decile in which the
original residual value lies. Data on GDP and population come from Heston et al. (2006) and geographic
variables come from Mayer and Zignago (2006). Bilateral distance and an English-speaking country
dummy are also included.
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Local sales 22.62 1.50 19.71 25.73
Sales to USA 19.98 1.99 14.00 24.74
Sales to other countries 20.98 1.85 16.78 24.67
Unit labour costs -0.98 0.47 -2.06 -0.24
Corporate taxation -1.39 0.59 -3.52 -0.57
Diff. of starting a business 2.32 1.20 0.00 4.93
Diff. of hiring 2.76 1.50 0.00 4.50
Diff. of firing 2.71 1.48 0.00 4.62
Envt. regulation stringency 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.61
Market size 19.15 1.31 15.95 21.75
External market potential 22.72 0.52 21.57 23.92
Population 9.29 0.64 7.24 10.16
Country risk 4.01 0.48 2.75 4.56
Trade openness 1.53 0.64 0.00 2.30
Distance 8.97 0.52 7.64 9.65
English speaking country 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00
Notes: Variables are in logarithms.
Summary statistics are given in Table 5. Data are available for 21 developed countries and 22 de-
veloping countries, listed in Table 2, and for the three benchmark survey years 1982, 1989 and 1994.
Variables are measured in logarithmic values.12 This has two advantages: such transformation reduces
the influence of large values and coefficients can be directly interpreted as partial elasticities. Each ex-
planatory variable is also lagged by one year to reduce any endogeneity bias and to take into account that
foreign investors base their location choice on past information.13
11The remoteness variable measures how geographically distant a given country is from world demand; it is calculated
according to Wagner et al. (2002)’s formula: Remti = 1P[(GDP tj=GDP tw)=Distij ] and when i = j, the country’s internal
distance is used.
12‘1’ is added when the value of an explanatory variable equals zero.
13Average tax rates are an exception since they have not been purposely lagged. To each benchmark year (1982, 1989, 1994)
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Influential observations, both in terms of leverage and outlierness, have been removed according to
the Cook (1977)’s D influence statistic.14 A Breusch and Pagan (1979) test and a Arellano and Bond
(1991) test respectively indicate that residuals are heteroscedastic and serially correlated. Following
Wooldridge (2003) standard errors are therefore corrected in order to be robust to both heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. Finally, a robust Hausman test proposed by Arellano (1993) indicates that the
explanatory variables are correlated with the country-specific unobserved effect. Time-constant omit-
ted explanatory variables may be the quality of infrastructure, agglomeration effects, the FDI regime or
spatial effects (Blonigen et al., 2007). For unbiasedness and consistency, a fixed effects approach must
thus be chosen. However, since some of the key variables of interest are time-invariant, their impact
on FDI cannot be estimated with a conventional fixed effects estimator as identification of the parame-
ters relies on the time variation within each cross section. The solution adopted in this paper is to use
the “fixed effects vector decomposition” (FEVD) estimator suggested by Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007).15
The FEVD technique involves three stages 1) Using a conventional fixed effects model, the unit (coun-
try) fixed effects are estimated; 2) These unit fixed effects are regressed on the time-invariant variables
(regulation variables, distance, language), in order to obtain their unexplained part, i.e. the part not ex-
plained by time-invariant variables; 3) Finally, a model which includes the time-varying variables, the
time-invariant variables, and the unexplained part of the fixed effects vector (the residuals from stage 2,
which control for the time-invariant unobserved factors) is estimated by pooled OLS and the degrees of
freedom used in the computation of standard errors are adjusted downwards to account for the estimated
individual effects in the first stage. This last stage is equivalent to a fixed effects model in which the
country-specific effects have been decomposed into an explained and unexplained part. Based on Monte
Carlo simulations, Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007) show that their FEVD estimator is more efficient and less
biased than competitive estimators (pooled OLS, random effects, Hausman-Taylor) when time-varying
correspond the three-year average tax rates for the years 1982, 1988 and 1994. Three reasons drive this choice. First no average
values for the years before 1982 can be calculated, precluding the consistent use of lagged average values. Second, although
a large amount of recent investment could reduce the observed tax rate, thanks to investment tax credits, Grubert and Mutti
(2000) demonstrate that their measure of corporate taxation is not jointly determined with US FDI at the country level. Third,
even if they are not systemically lagged, these three-year average tax rates convey, by construction, information on previous tax
choices. Note as well that for data availability reasons, lead content has been assumed constant over the period 1981-1983.
14More precisely, in order to keep the sample constant across regressions, the latter are only run with observations not deemed
influential for at least two different dependent variables.
15This estimator shares some common features with the hierarchical linear model described in Greene (2007).
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and time-invariant variables are correlated with the unobserved unit fixed effects in finite samples.16
4 Empirical Results
Results are presented in Table 6. The impacts of control variables, cost variables and regulation variables
are discussed in turn.
Column (1) shows that HFDI is attracted by countries which are large, rich, stable and English-
speaking. The positive sign of market potential suggests that demand spillovers may exist between
countries. Consistent with their trade costs saving purpose, HFDI tends to locate in distant and closed
countries. Column (2) indicates that the determinants of VFDI are fairly different. Market size and
market potential play no role and VFDI puts much more weight on country risk, which reflects the con-
clusions of Aizenman and Marion (2004). The negative sign of distance highlights that trade costs must
be sufficiently low for VFDI to occur since this FDI mode entails international trade of intermediate and
final goods. From this perspective, the negative and non-significant sign of trade openness is unexpected.
Finally, column (3) shows that EPFDI shares common characteristics with both VFDI and HFDI. Al-
though EPFDI tends to take place in stable, open, English-speaking and small countries, choice of the
latter depends on their proximity to the large markets of third countries.
Examination of the cost variables allows to investigate the sensitivity of FDI to the main short-run
policy instrument at the disposal of governments wishing to attract foreign investors, fiscal incentives.
Table 6 suggests that labour subsidies reducing the unit cost of labour would significantly influence all
types of FDI whereas a reduction in corporate taxes would only induce greater horizontal and vertical
FDI. In both cases, the impact is much stronger on FDI motivated by factor price differences, i.e. VFDI
and/or EPFDI. These results contrasts with previous literature for two reasons. First, despite their theoret-
ical importance, labour costs have been rarely included in FDI studies for data reasons, and when it was
16In order to investigate the correlation of the time-invariant variables with the unobserved part of the unit fixed effects, the
second stage has been estimated by 2SLS. Following Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) and Djankov et al. (2006), the regulation
variables are instrumented with the absolute value of latitude and of longitude, dummies for the legal origin of the country’s
commercial code or company law (English, French, Scandinavian) and dummies for the main religion (Catholic, Muslim,
Protestant). Exogeneity of the instruments is always satisfied but weakness of the instruments can only be rejected for the costs
of starting a business according to Cragg-Donald F-statistics. For this variable, the robust equivalent of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test (a C test) cannot reject its exogeneity, suggesting that the estimated coefficients for the time-invariant variables are unlikely
to suffer from an omitted variable bias.
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Table 6: Determinants of FDI, by FDI motivation
Sales to Sales to other
Local sales the United States foreign countries Total sales
Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit labour costs -0.14a -1.61a -1.08a -0.46a
(0.04) (0.47) (0.14) (0.03)
Corporate taxation -0.12a -0.77a 0.11 0.03b
(0.01) (0.26) (0.09) (0.01)
Diff. of starting a business 0.59a -0.61a -0.58a 0.44a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. of hiring 0.47a -0.49a -0.09a 0.43a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Diff. of firing -0.15a -0.35a -0.24a -0.13a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Envt. regulation stringency -0.37a 0.71 0.20 -0.37a
(0.04) (0.49) (0.14) (0.03)
Domestic market size (GDP) 1.71a -0.64 -0.52b 1.03a
(0.05) (0.93) (0.24) (0.03)
External market potential 1.12a 1.75 2.71a 1.57a
(0.07) (2.32) (0.55) (0.06)
Population -2.77a 1.64 1.08b -2.38a
(0.09) (1.31) (0.44) (0.07)
Country risk 0.42a 1.29a 1.40a 0.61a
(0.02) (0.40) (0.11) (0.02)
Trade openness -0.03a -0.16 0.24a 0.03a
(0.01) (0.21) (0.07) (0.01)
Distance 0.99a -1.18a 0.63a 1.22a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
English-speaking 0.17a 0.91a 0.68a 0.24a
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Unexplained fixed effects part 1.00a 1.00a 1.00a 1.00a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -20.96a -17.72a -51.94a -24.25a
(0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00)
Observations 102 102 102 102
Overall R-squared 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.99
Hausman test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Unreported time dummies are included. Independent variables are in logarithms.
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done, insignificant or statically positive results frequently occurred,17 leaving the impression that labour
costs do not matter to attract FDI, a supposition strongly rejected by findings of this paper. Second, it
has been increasingly common to argue that low tax rates can help to offset weak fundamentals since
corporate taxation is generally a strong negative FDI determinant. This conclusion remains generally
valid but labour subsidies may be in some cases a more effective instrument than a tax rate cut.
Dealing with the impact of regulations, all FDI types are deterred by the difficulty of firing workers.
This negative impact of exit costs conforms to the theoretical predictions of Haaland et al. (2003) and
Haaland andWooton (2007) and corroborates the findings of previous research. Curiously, whereas VFDI
and EPFDI are also negatively influenced by the high costs of starting a business and the difficulties of
hiring new workers, with a much larger impact on “footloose” VFDI, the opposite is true for HFDI. Since
high entry costs reduce domestic product market competition and by extension increase mark-ups,18 it is
possible that market-oriented FDI is attracted by these regulatory-induced supernormal profits. Thanks to
their ownership advantages, foreign firms are able to overcome these entry barriers, where domestic firms
cannot (Driffield, 2001). Finally, stringency of environmental regulations only significantly influences
HFDI, and with a negative sign, implying that HFDI tends to occur in less polluted countries. These
last results give little credence to the “pollution haven” hypothesis. US MNEs, which must respect the
high standards of their home country, may find it cheaper, more forward-looking and less risky to use
the same ‘green’ production technology everywhere: abatement technology may be an integral part of
the production process, environmental standards in host countries could tighten in the future and ‘green’
consumers may refuse to consume environmentally-damaging products.
Column (4) demonstrates the importance of decomposing FDI by motives of affiliate operations by
using as dependent variable total sales, i.e. the sum of local sales, sales to the United States and sales
to other foreign countries. Given the dominant presence of HFDI in total FDI, results for total sales
are fairly close to what has been found in column (1). Nevertheless, some variables have a surprising
17These “disappointing” results are likely to be explained by the use of absolute labour costs variable, which ignores the
compensating effects of labour productivity and/or a focus on developed countries, for which variations in labour costs between
and within countries are smaller than for developing countries.
18Djankov et al. (2002) find some evidence that in countries which regulates the most entry, competition is perceived to be
less intense. Griffith and Harrison (2004) show that the difficulty of starting a business and labour regulations have a positive
impact on mark-ups in OECD countries.
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sign. For instance, taxes are predicted to have a positive effect on total FDI. Brainard (1997), who ran
a very similar regression, found the same contradictory impact. In addition, despite the predominance
of HFDI, trade openness is predicted to increase total FDI. Many papers report the same paradoxical
result. Findings of this paper suggest that both puzzles can be explained by aggregation bias caused by
inappropriate pooling of FDI data.
Overall, the empirical results are fairly close to what theory predicts, with clear differences in the
determinants of HFDI, VFDI and EPFDI. They also generally do not contradict conclusions of past
empirical studies,19 although four notable exceptions exist. First, excessive labour and product market
regulations are not always found to directly deter FDI. In fact, HFDI is found to be higher in countries
exhibiting high entry costs, suggesting that the latter may be more than counterbalanced by the economic
rents that they create. Second, contrary to most studies, the distance variable has always the expected
sign: positive for FDI motivated by the “proximity-concentration” trade-off, negative for FDI motivated
by factor costs differences. Unreported regressions show that distance would have had a negative effect
on HFDI if the unexplained part of the fixed effects vector had not been included.20 Such a result
highlights the usefulness and appropriateness of the FEVD methodology. Useful as the effects of time-
invariant variables can be estimated. Appropriate because omitted variable bias should clearly be a
concern in all FDI studies. Third, in line with the theoretical predictions of Baltagi et al. (2007) for
complex FDI,21 but contrary to their empirical results and those of Blonigen et al. (2007), external market
potential, described by Baltagi et al. (2007) as “the spatially weighted third-market size of a given host
economy’s competitors” (p. 271), has a positive and significant impact on HFDI and EPFDI, while the
impact on VFDI is also positive but not significant.
Table 7 provides additional support to the importance of third-country effects in FDI estimations by
19The results obtained may be interpreted as only contributing the literature on US FDI. However, it is likely that FDI by other
major source countries are driven by the same factors. Mody and Srinivasan (1998) find similarities in the determinants of US
and Japanese FDI with convergence towards the end of the eighties and Braconier et al. (2005) cannot reject the appropriateness
of pooling together US and Swedish data on outward FDI. Even if it was not the case, the specificity of the United States would
be strongly attenuated by the fact that it is the largest foreign direct investor in the world.
20In a related FDI study, Davies et al. (2008) find that the impact of distance on bilateral aggregate FDI switches from
negative to positive when they estimate their empirical model by FEVD instead of OLS. Given that horizontal FDI accounts for
the bulk of total FDI, this result is consistent with our findings.
21They argue that an increase in the size of third countries markets generate more revenues which allow MNEs to more easily
cover fixed (plant set-up) costs.
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Table 7: Spatial autocorrelation
Local Sales Sales to the United States
Spatial autocorrelation tests
Moran’s I value 0.09a 0.03c
Spatial error ( = 0):
Robust Lagrange multiplier (p-value) 0.56 0.91 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.28
Spatial lag ( = 0):
Robust Lagrange multiplier (p-value) 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.10 0.05 0.90
Coefficient spatially weighted FDI () 0.11 -0.47 -0.07 0.09 -0.11 -0.16
(0.24) (0.38) (0.08) (0.50) (0.55) (0.25)
External market potential No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Unexplained fixed effects part No No Yes No No Yes
Sales to third countries Total sales
Spatial autocorrelation tests
Moran’s I value 0.19a 0.11a
Spatial error ( = 0):
Robust Lagrange multiplier (p-value) 0.08 0.28 0.21 0.31 0.54 0.12
Spatial lag ( = 0):
Robust Lagrange multiplier (p-value) 0.00 0.22 0.68 0.06 0.69 0.53
Coefficient spatially weighted FDI () 0.77a 0.32 0.02 0.47 -0.08 0.03
(0.20) (0.43) (0.09) (0.27) (0.42) (0.06)
External market potential No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Unexplained fixed effects part No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. E(I)=-0.02. Row-standardized
spatial weights matrix (W ), with weights initially corresponding to the inverse of the bilateral distance
between the biggest cities of two countries. Since tests and estimation method apply to cross section
analysis,‘between’ regressions are used. Spatial lag regression models are estimated by maximum
likelihood. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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providing cross-sectional tests of spatial autocorrelation.22 Moran (1948)’s I measure of global spatial
autocorrelation indicates that for every kind of FDI, positive spatial clustering cannot be rejected. How-
ever, the robust Lagrange multiplier tests for spatial error dependence and for spatial lag dependence
suggest that only VFDI and EPFDI are statistically spatially clustered. The significant tests for spatial
autocorrelation can be interpreted as the necessary inclusion of a spatially-weighted FDI term, as in
Blonigen et al. (2007). On the other hand, in the case of EPFDI, they may simply reflect the omission of
an important variable highly correlated with spatially lagged FDI, the external market potential. Thanks
to their proximity to large markets, even large European OECD economies host a high share of EPFDI
(see Table 2).23 Indeed, once external market potential is included, the existence of spatial effects is
rejected for EPFDI. However, spatial autocorrelation remains a concern for VFDI, which can neverthe-
less be dealt with the inclusion of the unexplained part of the fixed effects vector. This suggests that
these spatial interactions are fairly stable over time. Globally, Table 7 shows that third country effects
and spatial interdependence influence respectively the location of EPFDI and VFDI, lending thus some
support to the theoretical predictions of Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007) and emphasising
the need to control for external market potential and unobserved time-invariant factors in FDI studies.
5 Quantification and Discussion
The previous section has shown that a country wishing to attract further FDI can increase unambiguously
its attractiveness by lowering unit labour costs, cutting corporate taxes or loosening firing regulations.
Figure 1 quantifies their impacts. Developing and developed countries have been distinguished because
their FDI composition differs, notably in terms of the relative importance of VFDI (see Table 2). It can
22There are three forms of spatial autoccorelation/spatial dependence. In a spatial error model (y = X + ;  = W+ 
with W the spatial weighting matrix and  an i.i.d. error term), errors are not independent across countries. OLS estimators
remain unbiased and consistent but the estimated standard errors need to be adjusted for spatial correlation. In a spatial lag
model (y = Wy+X+), outcome in one country depends on the outcome in neighbouring countries through the inclusion
of a spatially lagged dependent variable. It differs from the spatial error model in that it allows for an influence of the outcome
in neighbouring countries beyond that reflected in error terms. Ignoring a present spatial lag is equivalent to an omitted variable
bias while including a spatial lag generates a simultaneity bias. In both cases, OLS estimators are biased and inconsistent.
Maximum likelihood methods are typically used to estimate a spatial lag model. Finally a spatial cross-regressive model
(y = X +WX + ), in which third country effects such as external market potential are included, can be estimated by
OLS as long as no spatially correlated errors are detected. For a nice introduction to spatial econometrics see Anselin and Bera
(1998).
23Local spatial autocorrelation statistics indicate that there is high positive spatial clustering around these countries, espe-
cially, Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom.
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be seen that increasing FDI by 5 per cent in an ‘average’ developing country requires either to reduce the
firing restrictions index by 25 per cent or to lower labour costs by about 10 per cent or to decrease the tax
rate by 27 per cent. Similar requirements are found for an ‘average’ developed country, at the exception of
the tax rate cut which needs to be higher (36 per cent) since relatively more VFDI in developed countries
must be attracted to raise overall FDI, dominated by the less tax-responsive HFDI and EPFDI. This FDI
composition effect may explain why previous studies such as Mutti and Grubert (2004) have found that
changes in tax rates exert a stronger impact on FDI in developing countries than in developed countries.
For comparisons, the required decrease in country risk is also reported. In line with its strong importance
for all FDI types, a small change in its value (about 7 per cent) is needed. However, an improvement in
the main factor which influences country risk, i.e. the quality of institutions, is unlikely to be achievable
in the short run.
Figure 1: Policies required to increase total FDI by 5 per cent in an average country
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Notes: The last three clusters indicate the percentage increase of each FDI type in an average country following a policy change.
Figure 1 makes it clear that a labour subsidy or a tax rate cut can obviously increase attractive-
ness. Indeed, they have been widely used by developing countries. According to Kobrin (2005), during
the 1992-2001 period, the creation or the increase of incentives represented one-third of the favourable
changes introduced by developing countries in their FDI policy, followed by sectoral liberalisation (21
per cent), better operational conditions (16 per cent) and higher guarantees (12 per cent). However, their
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drawbacks are well-known. There is no certainty that their costs will be smaller than the expected future
FDI benefits and will not generate substantial indirect costs such as an inefficient allocation of capital,
an increase in administrative costs and corruption, the attraction of foreign investors which would have
come even in the absence of incentives,24 and the generation of a bidding contest over incentive values
among host countries (Oman, 2000; Wells et al., 2001; Blo¨mstrom and Kokko, 2003; Charlton, 2003).
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, tax rate cuts in developed countries will have to be extremely
high since most of the FDI that these countries attract is fairly tax-insensitive.
Labour market deregulation, in the form of looser firing constraints, may be a much more favourable
alternative. Cutting the firing restrictions index by half in an average country would increase FDI by
10 per cent, an effect equivalent to giving a labour subsidy equal to about 20 per cent of labour costs
or lowering the tax rate by 54-72 per cent. Such a policy would also reduce the bargaining power of
workers, initially leading to a fall in nominal wages and unit labour costs, which would reinforce the
positive impact of labour market deregulation on FDI. Obviously, for this very reason, labour market
deregulation is frequently opposed by currently employed workers since they lose from it, at least in the
short run. Product market deregulation and active labour market policies may mitigate worker resistance.
Stronger competition, through a generalised reduction of entry costs, should decrease markups, in-
crease employment and raise real wages (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). In addition, by reducing
monopoly rents, of which a share is appropriated by employed workers, product market competition
reduces the incentives of the latter to resist labour market deregulation since there are fewer rents to ap-
propriate. Hence, by initially raising the real wage and decreasing incentives for workers to resist labour
market reforms, product market deregulation may help to achieve labour market deregulation. It could be
objected that estimates of Table 6 suggest that lowering entry costs, i.e. the costs of starting a business,
would lead to a loss of FDI, which may not be compensated by the expected FDI gains if future labour
market reforms were too shallow. However, such a reasoning ignores the fact that deregulation in goods
and labour markets increases market size, which is a strong positive determinant of total FDI.25 Accord-
ing to Table 6, FDI will remain constant if a 1 per cent reduction in entry costs generates an increase
24According to the results of a study reported in Halvorsen (1995), in 1984, 70 per cent of the investments which received
incentives in Thailand would have anyway occurred.
25For the average country, the elasticity of total FDI with respect to market size is 1.12 per cent. For an example of the
negative impact of stricter labour regulations on output, see Besley and Burgess (2004).
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in GDP per capita of 0.22 per cent. Estimates of Barseghyan (2008) for a large sample of developed
and developing countries indicate that at the sample mean a 1 per cent decrease in entry costs increases
GDP per worker by about 0.40 per cent. In 2006, average labour force participation rate in the world
was about 70 per cent,26 implying that a 1 per cent decrease in entry costs increases GDP per capita by
about 0.28 per cent. Hence, once its indirect impact on market size is taken into account, it is very likely
that product market deregulation by itself increases FDI rather than reduces it. For an ‘average’ country,
decreasing the costs of starting a business by 25 per cent would eventually increase FDI by about 1.60 per
cent. It is a relatively small but reassuring overall effect as easing business entry has been since 2003 the
most popular reform in developed and developing countries according to the World BankDoing Business
reports:27 it is fairly easy and cheap to implement and unlikely to be opposed by the electorate.
Active labour market policies may also lower the opposition of workers to labour market deregulation
by increasing the likelihood that they will find a job if they become unemployed. Job search assistance
and training measures have been found to improve employment probability (Kluve and Schmidt, 2002).
A funding of these measures through an increase in the corporate tax rate on foreign firms can be com-
patible with higher FDI as long as labour market deregulation is strong enough. For instance, an increase
of 5 per cent points of the tax rate (19 per cent) in the average developing country to finance active labour
market policies would be associated with a 3.5 per cent increase in FDI if the firing restrictions index
was simultaneously reduced by about one-third.
Finally, an additional case could be made for labour market deregulation based on the type of FDI
that such a policy would influence. Despite early pessimism in the literature, recent papers (Javor-
cik Smarzynska, 2004; Girma et al., 2008) have found that FDI creates positive productivity spillovers
for domestic firms in host countries. The effects and diffusion of these externalities tend be greater when
FDI are domestic-market oriented. Hence, FDI policies which strongly influence HFDI may be the most
favourable to the development of the local economy. Figure 1 shows that for the same increase in over-
all FDI, lower firing constraints would generate an increase in HFDI equivalent or stronger than those
26Average labour force participation rate for the study sample was 67 per cent during the 1982-1994 period and 70 per cent
in 2006. Note that (Y/P)=(Y/L)*(L/P), where Y is output, P is total population and L is the number of workers, approximated
by the working-age population. Data come from the World Development Indicators 2008.
27See “Who reformed” http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/reformers.xls
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generated by a tax rate cut or a labour subsidy.
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated different policies that a country could implement fairly rapidly to improve its
FDI attractiveness. Granting fiscal incentives to foreign investors can be an effective strategy, especially
in developing countries, but their use frequently suffers from many drawbacks. Economy-wide policies
aiming at easing firing rules provides a favourable alternative to these traditional instruments, as it is
found that they have large volume effects and potentially positive compositional effects. Furthermore
their short-run positive effect on FDI should be reinforced in the medium-run by a deregulation-related
increase in market size. Compared to FDI incentives, one major caveat is that labour market deregulation
may take time as incumbent workers are likely to oppose it. Product market deregulation and active
labour policies may mitigate their resistance and contribute to greater attraction of FDI in the medium
run. On the other hand, environmental dumping is a totally ineffective strategy, including for attracting
FDI seeking to minimise costs. Finally, beyond the issues of FDI attractiveness, this paper highlights the
different aggregation and omitted variable biases that have affected results of previous studies on US FDI
and provides some support to recent theoretical models of FDI by showing that third country effects and
spatial interdependence influence respectively the location of export-platform FDI and vertical FDI.
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